



1 Inn in Reno, and Hamilton Inn & Suites in Carson City. (*Id.*). Hilton's other brands such as  
2 Conrad Hotels and Resorts, Hilton Hotels and Resorts, DoubleTree by Hilton, Embassy Suites  
3 Hotels, Hilton Garden Inn, Hampton Hotels, Homewood Suites by Hilton, Home2Suites by  
4 Hilton, and Hilton Grand Vacations "may be doing business" in Nevada. (*Id.*).

Plaintiff alleged the following facts. (*Id.* at 14). On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff and her husband, Randall Harris, traveled to San Diego, California, to attend their daughter's graduation. (*Id.*). They reserved a room at the DoubleTree Hilton Hotel located at 7450 Hazard Center Drive, Mission Valley, San Diego, California. (*Id.*). On August 13, 2011, Plaintiff went to take a shower and as "she stepped into the bathtub/shower her foot slipped on the bathtub floor causing her to fall and fracture five of her ribs." (*Id.*). Her ribs were broken and/or severely separated causing substantial pain and bleeding in her right lung. (*Id.*). Prior to August 13th, DoubleTree knew or should have known prior to the incident that the surface of the bathtub/shower was unduly slippery and needed to be repaired and properly maintained to correct its slippery condition. (*Id.*). DoubleTree "failed and neglected to forewarn [Plaintiff] of the bathtub's slippery and dangerous condition before she fell." (*Id.* at 15). DoubleTree failed and neglected to take any precautionary measures to provide for the safety and health of their guests even though it knew of the potential dangerous hazard that existed in the bathroom. (*Id.*). DoubleTree neglected and failed to make rubberized mats readily available and failed to install safety hand grips. (*Id.*). Harris sought in excess of \$26,000 for medical expenses; in excess of \$50,000 for past and future pain, suffering, discomfort, and disfigurement; and in excess of \$5,000 for past and future loss of income. (*Id.* at 16). Harris also sought attorneys' fees and costs. (*Id.*).

23 The pending motion now follows

## **LEGAL STANDARD**

25 In opposing a defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff  
26 bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper. *CollegeSource, Inc. v.*  
27 *AcademyOne, Inc.*, 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011). Where a defendant's motion is  
28 based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a

1 prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss. *Id.* However, the  
2 plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint. *Id.* A court may not  
3 assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit, but the court  
4 will resolve factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor. *Id.*

## 5 DISCUSSION

6 DoubleTree files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.  
7 R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), or in the alternative, to change venue to the Southern District of California  
8 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Mot. to Dismiss (#4) at 1). DoubleTree asserts that it is a  
9 Delaware LLC headquartered in McLean, Virginia, and registered with the Nevada Secretary  
10 of State as a foreign LLC. (*Id.* at 3). DoubleTree argues that the only contact between Plaintiff  
11 and DoubleTree was the accident that occurred in California. (*Id.*). DoubleTree contends that  
12 Plaintiff does not allege facts for specific jurisdiction but attempts to establish general  
13 jurisdiction by devoting a paragraph to references to entities that are unrelated to DoubleTree's  
14 presence in the State. (*Id.*). DoubleTree asserts that it operates one hotel in Nevada which  
15 is located in Clark County. (*Id.*). DoubleTree argues that this Court lacks general jurisdiction  
16 over it because it does not have substantial or continuous and systematic contacts in Nevada  
17 because it is registered as a foreign LLC and not a domestic LLC. (*Id.* at 7). DoubleTree also  
18 argues that it is unreasonable for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it under the  
19 facts of the case. (*Id.* at 7-13).

20 In response, Plaintiff argues that Hilton Worldwide Inc. has a corporate umbrella of a  
21 significant number of Hilton properties doing business in Nevada including DoubleTree by  
22 Hilton Hotel Las Vegas Airport, Hilton Garden Inn in Elko, Hilton Garden Inn Las  
23 Vegas/Henderson, Hilton Homewood Suites in Reno, Hilton Grand Vacations Club in Las  
24 Vegas, Hilton Garden Inn in Las Vegas, Hilton Garden Inn Reno, and Hampton Inn & Suites  
25 in Carson City. (Opp'n. to Mot. to Dismiss (#11) at 2). Plaintiff argues that DoubleTree is  
26 subject to general jurisdiction in Nevada because it operates and manages the DoubleTree  
27 by Hilton Hotel Las Vegas Airport and is registered as a foreign corporation with the Nevada  
28 Secretary of State. (*Id.* at 6-7). Plaintiff asserts that due process is satisfied because

1 DoubleTree waived service of the first amended complaint. (*Id.* at 7).

2 In reply, DoubleTree asserts that Hilton Worldwide, Inc. is not a party to this suit and  
 3 was voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff in the first amended complaint and, thus, Hilton  
 4 Worldwide's contacts within Nevada are irrelevant. (Reply to Mot. to Dismiss (#13) at 2).  
 5 DoubleTree argues that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that acceptance of service  
 6 does not waive any objection to personal jurisdiction or venue. (*Id.* at 7).

7 "Due process requires 'that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment *in personam*,  
 8 if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with  
 9 it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and  
 10 substantial justice.'" *Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd.*, 328 F.3d  
 11 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316,  
 12 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). The Court may exercise either general or specific personal  
 13 jurisdiction.

14 "A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)  
 15 corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are  
 16 so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State."  
 17 *Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown*, \_\_ U.S. \_\_, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851, 180  
 18 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011). General jurisdiction cases are "instances in which the continuous  
 19 corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit  
 20 against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." *Id.*  
 21 at \_\_, 131 S.Ct. at 2853. "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general  
 22 jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which  
 23 the corporation is fairly regarded as at home." *Id.* at \_\_, 131 S.Ct. at 2853-54. A corporation's  
 24 continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that the  
 25 corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity. *Id.* at \_\_, 131 S.Ct. at 2856.

26 In *Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co.*, 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485  
 27 (1952), the Supreme Court held that general jurisdiction was permissible. See *Goodyear*  
 28 *Dunlop*, \_\_ U.S. at \_\_, 131 S.Ct. at 2856. There, the defendant, who was sued in Ohio, was

1 a Philippine mining corporation that had ceased activities in the Philippines during World War  
2 II. *Id.* To the extent that the company was doing any business during that time, it was doing  
3 so in Ohio. *Id.* The corporation's president had maintained his office in Ohio, kept the  
4 company files in that office, and had supervised from the Ohio office "the necessarily limited  
5 wartime activities of the company." *Id.* The Supreme Court held that, although the claim-in-  
6 suit did not arise in Ohio, it would not violate due process for Ohio to adjudicate the  
7 controversy. *Id.*

8 In *Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall*, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868,  
9 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984), survivors of United States citizens who died in a helicopter crash in  
10 Peru instituted wrongful death actions in a Texas state court against the owner and operator  
11 of the helicopter, a Colombian corporation. See *Goodyear Dunlop*, \_\_ U.S. at \_\_, 131 S.Ct.  
12 at 2856. The Supreme Court held that the Colombian corporation had no place of business  
13 in Texas and was not licensed to do business there. *Id.* The company's contacts in Texas  
14 consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session;  
15 accepting into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing  
16 helicopters, equipment, and training services from a Texas enterprise for substantial sums;  
17 and sending personnel to Texas for training. *Id.* The Supreme Court held that those links to  
18 Texas did not constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts  
19 found to exist in *Perkins* and were insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction  
20 over a claim that neither arose out of nor was related to defendant's activities in Texas. *Id.*

21 As an initial matter, Plaintiff's argument that DoubleTree is subject to personal  
22 jurisdiction in Nevada because it waived service of process is unavailing. Federal Rule of Civil  
23 Procedure 4(d)(5) explicitly states that "[w]aiving service of a summons does not waive any  
24 objection to personal jurisdiction or to venue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(5).

25 The Court finds that it lacks general personal jurisdiction over DoubleTree. The Court  
26 notes that DoubleTree Management LLC and Hilton Worldwide, Inc. are two separate  
27 corporations and, thus, Plaintiff must establish facts to exert general jurisdiction over the  
28


corporation it is suing.<sup>1</sup> Based on the pleadings before the Court, DoubleTree is a Delaware LLC that is headquartered in McLean, Virginia. DoubleTree operates only one hotel in Nevada—DoubleTree by Hilton Hotel Las Vegas Airport. Hilton Worldwide, Inc. operates a handful of hotels throughout the state. DoubleTree is registered as a foreign corporation with the Nevada Secretary of State's Office and has a commercial registered agent in Las Vegas. Nevertheless, there are no allegations that DoubleTree conducts any national corporate business from its one Las Vegas hotel. As such, this Court does not find that Nevada is where the DoubleTree corporation is fairly regarded as home. Additionally, DoubleTree's contacts in the state do not support the demand that it be amenable to suits in Nevada for a claim that arose solely out of actions that occurred in its San Diego, California hotel. Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant DoubleTree and grants DoubleTree's Motion to Dismis for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (#4).

### **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant DoubleTree Management LLC's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, or in the Alternative, to Change Venue (#4) is GRANTED. The Court dismisses this case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED: This 27th day of February, 2013.



\_\_\_\_\_  
United States District Judge

<sup>1</sup> Under the alter ego test, a court "may find the necessary contacts to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent company by virtue of its relationship to a subsidiary that has continual operations in the forum." *Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.*, 644 F.3d 909, 920 (9th Cir. 2011). This test is "predicated upon a showing of parental control over the subsidiary." *Id.* In this case, Plaintiff has not established that Hilton Worldwide, Inc. controls DoubleTree such that there is a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the two entities no longer exist and that the failure to disregard their separate identities would result in fraud or injustice. See *id.*